Predetermined Free Willy

Do you believe we have free will?

The popular position among neuroscientists seems to be that it's nothing more than a handy dandy self-delusion that keeps society going. Our actions are merely the shiny, polished products of an extremely complex input-output program: our brains.

According to them, there is no "I chose to do this" in the terms most of us are accustomed to—just a big wad of neurons that weighs all the options with prior experiences and makes you do things. In oft-cited studies by a researcher named Benjamin Libet, the brain even lit up and revealed its intentions before subjects noted their own awareness of what they were doing (although I admit I'm a little dubious of evidence that relies on self-reporting.)

A common argument for free will has people saying "Well sometimes I want do something but then I don't!" But if, for a relatable example, you were deeply in love with your best friend's grandma, the act of resisting that mighty craving wouldn't mean you've conquered your impulses and your brain.

Many a scientist would say that before you even became conscious of it, good ol' brainington already considered that pursuing gammy would probably damage your friendship, alienate you from society and that she might reject your too-smooth body anyway and break your heart. Even if it was a difficult conclusion to come to, it was out of your hands.

But this all just a sloppily paraphrased version of one theory.

Is it so unfathomable to think that this sense of being on autopilot might be the illusion? That there's something we've yet to fully understand about how the brain, consciousness and our perception of reality works? Sure, maybe. Maybe it doesn't have to be so strictly one or the other, freedom versus determinism. Maybe it depends on how you define free will.

What's scary is the notion that if it somehow, someday it becomes a consensus that there is no free will, what would that mean for our legal systems? I didn't do it; that awful meatball in my head did.